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Abstract Involuntary memories raise worries for any notion of constitution 
of memorial experiences and of the relationship between subjectivity, the 
past, and intentionality. However, this does not mean they are wholly in-
tractable for an intentional analysis of consciousness. To the contrary, if one 
avoids conflating the will with thetic or express intentional acts, the Sartrean 
notion of intentionality is well-placed to account for the most salient features 
of involuntary memories, without resorting to appeals to non-subjective 
memorial processes in which any sense of implication or investment in the 
content of involuntary memory seems difficult to locate. To make this case, 
two steps are taken. The first is to map out a Sartrean phenomenology of 
memory, by taking into consideration how his notions of intentional con-
sciousness, absence, and lack play out at the level of memory. The second is 
to examine how the Sartrean model of intentional consciousness appears to 
be well-adapted to the phenomenal traits most salient to involuntary 
memories. The upshot of such an examination is a provocative pheno-
menological position on the nature of the resistance of the past and on doing 
justice to the past, that is, in regard to how memorial intentionality ought be 
conceived when involuntary memories contribute to the rule rather than 
merely being an exception in the experience of the past. 
 
 
A cogent phenomenological theory of memory should be able to tell us 
not just about our access to past experience but also about any restrictions 
thereupon. The difficulty here lies in the different ways in which the past 
proves adverse to recollection. It is one thing for there to be a breakdown tout 
court of either semantic or episodic memory, such as when one becomes 
 
1
simply oblivious to a previously encountered word, face, or event. It seems to 
be something else entirely when one struggles to recollect a moment or an 
item from the past — being on the verge of reliving it — which in 
psychological terms seems to indicate a kind of “metamemory.”1 While both 
of these cases, which may occur in almost any situation where one works 
through the past, represent the limits of the subjective capacity to relive the 
past, only the latter may be counted as an instance where past experience 
resists being given anew, and yet signals its being forgotten.  
To the extent that it constitutes a sort of heuristic failure of memory, 
the case of struggling to recollect or “metamemory” presents the phenomeno-
logy of memory with no small challenge; when one struggles to recollect 
what happened during a past event, something from the past is indeed given, 
albeit in an unfulfilling or inadequate fashion. How then to describe the 
experience of something on the verge of remembrance, which at the same 
time resists the subjective effort at recollection? Doesn't the fact that there 
can be such a heuristic failure of recollection force us to reconsider the role 
of and the restrictions upon intentionality in allowing for access to past 
experience? 
A concern of this sort can be seen to underlie the motivations 
philosophers have had for looking at involuntary memories. Such memories 
prompt a reassessment of the primacy of intentionality in memory in 
particular, and of the aims of phenomenology of memory in general, insofar 
as they constitute an illustration of how there may be an experience of the 
past in spite of any subjective, intentional act. In other words, involuntary 
memories show how something from the past — be it a traumatic or 
apparently insignificant event — may appear independent of or even in 
opposition to any volitional, representational aims, for instance, to relive past 
experience. In involuntary memories, therefore, the success or failure of an 
effort to recover a lost or absent past would seem to be of little import; 
rather, involuntary memories are characterized by their foreignness to any 
will to recollect and their tenuous relationship to the context and situation 
within which they occur. 
Involuntary memories hence raise serious worries for any notion of 
constitution of memorial experiences and of the relationship between 
subjectivity, the past, and intentionality. It is this last worry in particular that 
this paper shall attempt to question. Just how fatal are involuntary memories 
for the role of intentionality in recollection? Do they entail a wholesale 
                                                     
1 Elizabeth A. Styles, Attention, Perception, and Memory (New York: Taylor and 
Francis, 2005) 266. 
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diminishment of the primacy of intentionality in memorial consciousness, 
with important repercussions for other forms of consciousness as well? On 
the strength of their evidence, does one have no choice but to subscribe to 
Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the role of “thetic” or express intentionality in 
experience in general,1 which would especially apply to involuntary 
memories in particular? Must we simply accept with the stark opposition 
Deleuze sets up between voluntary — i.e. failed2 — versus involuntary — 
i.e. successful — experiences of the past, and the complimentary implication 
that any intentional analysis of memory could only leave us on the wrong 
side of the ‘force’ and ‘violence’ of the involuntary without which “thought 
is nothing”?3  
In taking up these questions, we shall explore a somewhat unusual 
perspective, namely by attempting to restitute a significant role for ‘thetic’ or 
express intentional consciousness in involuntary memories. This approach, if 
successful, shall point to some problems within those accounts of memory, 
like Merleau-Ponty’s or Deleuze’s, which may be said to privilege memorial 
institution4 above subjective constitution. The decisive issue will be whether 
the sort of intentional consciousness at work in memory is solely at the 
service of the stale, reflective, and voluntary reproductions of the type that 
enfeeble, if not distort, the recollecting of the past. If one avoids conflating 
                                                     
1 The advance of this critique can already be seen in Merleau-Ponty’s early sub-
ordination of what he calls “thetic” or express intentionality to “operative inten-
tionality (fungierende Intentionalität)” and Heideggerian “transcendence;” see 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, C. Smith (Trans.) 
F. Williams (Ed.) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, 1981) 418. In his later 
work, this is carried to the point of a practical effacement of intentionality as a 
phenomenal trait, such as when Merleau-Ponty claims that “the ‘visual quale’ gives 
me, and is alone in doing so, the presence of what is not me, of what is simply and 
fully.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” Carleton Dallery (trans.) in Ted 
Toadvine and Len Lawlor (eds.) The Merleau-Ponty Reader (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1964, 2007) 375. 
2 Deleuze claims that when memory occurs “in a voluntary form” — for instance in 
“the interpretations of signs of love” — it is “doomed to a pathetic failure,” and 
thereby raises the question of how involuntary memories might “intervene” in its 
place. See Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, Richard Howard (trans.) (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 52-53. 
3 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 95: “The great theme of Time regained is that the 
search for truth is the characteristic adventure of the involuntary. Thought is nothing 
without something that forces and does violence to it. More important than thought is 
‘what leads to thought’...” 
4 That is, apparently non- or a-subjective events or processes of memory. 
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the will with thetic or express intentional acts, as is argued in the work of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, then the notion of intentionality offers favorable prospects 
of accounting for the most pronounced features of involuntary memories, 
without resorting to appeals to non-subjective memorial processes in which 
any sense of implication with or attachment to the content of involuntary 
memory seems difficult to locate. 
 To advance this case — that the Sartrean conception of ‘thetic,’ 
intentional consciousness can be conducive rather than obstructive to a 
phenomenological account of precisely that sort of memory that proves 
resistant to willful or voluntary representation, the reliving of the past involv-
ed in involuntary memories — two steps are required. The first is to map out 
a Sartrean phenomenology of memory, by taking into consideration how to 
understand how his notions of intentional consciousness, absence, and lack 
play out at the level of memory. The second will be to explore how the 
Sartrean model of intentional consciousness proves particularly adept at 
plotting the distribution of phenomenal traits most salient to involuntary 
memories. The upshot of such an examination is a provocative phenomeno-
logical position on the nature of the resistance of the past and on doing 
justice to the past, that is, in regard to how memorial intentionality ought be 
conceived when involuntary memories contribute to the rule, rather than 
being the exception, in our experience of the past. 
 
It is no straightforward matter to propose a Sartrean phenomenological 
account of memorial consciousness. On the one hand, this is because it 
requires some care to elaborate its links to his phenomenology of images and 
the Husserlian pedigree present in both. One the other, one cannot get around 
the fact that in Sartre’s writings, memory is not so much an object of 
systematic inquiry as a foil for his exploration of consciousness. Nonetheless, 
it is still possible to distinguish two predominant traits of his understanding 
of and remarks on memory, at least in his earlier, more explicitly 
phenomenological works. First, Sartre’s reflections on the nature of memory 
are notable for the status attributed to the past to which memory is related. 
Second, it is crucial to understand how Sartre’s phenomenology sets up an 
account of memory highly attentive to impassioned or engaged character of 
all recollecting of the past. 
First, as Sartre simply writes, “[t]he Past is,” which is to say, there can 
be little question of its non-being; the past manifests positive and demons-
Bull. anal. phén. X 2 (2014) 
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trable traits of existence.1 In cases of memory, then, the problem lies not with 
the being of the past, but with our access to it. While the past certainly affects 
every individual,2 the difficult thing to understand is the particular way the 
past remains absent and resists becoming present in memory, rather than 
wholly giving itself over to the intent to remember.  
Here, we can illuminate these issues surrounding memory as a relation 
to something absent by way of a comparison to Sartre’s phenomenology of 
imagination.3 The imaginative intention, in order to attain a certain kind of 
intuitive fulfillment,4 has to be related to a kind of ground or sensuous basis 
that Sartre calls an “analogical representative of the intended object.”5 
Different sorts of things can function as this material basis for the image — 
the painting, the photograph, the carpet stain — all of which appear to be 
characterized by their resemblance to a particular object.6 Resemblance, 
however, is only ever a “neutral” relationship of something looking like 
something else according to Sartre, meaning that either a perceptual or 
imaginative stance may be adopted toward it.7 Resemblance is thus at best 
only a necessary but not sufficient condition for images, in particular because 
it cannot account for the phenomenon of “solicitation” or the ‘expressive-
ness’ of the sensuous material through which the imaginative intention 
reaches its object. That is, resemblance does not yet explain the “force,” in 
Sartre’s terms, with which the presence of the imagined object is evoked 
through an image thing like a painting or a sketch. What’s more, the nuance 
                                                     
1 “Between past and present there is an absolute heterogeneity; and if I can not enter 
the past, it is because the past is.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An 
Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, Hazel Barnes (trans.) (London: Routledge, 
1958) 119. 
2 As ground of our living present, we “have to be [the past],” rather than having the 
past merely as ‘a past.’ See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 115. 
3 This is a connection encouraged in both The Psychology of Imagination and in 
Being and Nothingness (108). 
4 That is, in what Husserl would call the inauthentic ‘presentation’ of the imaginative 
act. See Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume II, J. N. Findlay (trans.), 
Dermot Moran (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1970, 2001) 226, 231-33. 
5 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) 
(London: Routledge, 1948) 20. 
6 Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, 20. 
7 Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, 22. Here we are following a definition of 
resemblance laid out by Kulvicki, where resemblance in a weaker sense means 
“looking alike” instead of in the stronger sense of judging two things “to be 
genuinely similar in that they share specified properties.” John Kulvicki, On Images: 
Their Structure and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 82.  
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in Sartre’s account lies in the suggestion that despite being founded in the 
sensuous traits of the thing, this analogical grounding or “intuitive basis” of 
the image is precisely not perceived:1  
These forms, these colors, so strongly organized, proclaim themselves as 
being almost the image of Peter. If a notion strikes me to perceive these 
elements, they resist. A picture offers itself spontaneously in relief to the 
imaginative consciousness, and the perceptual consciousness would have 
much trouble to see it as a flat surface.2 
That is, the attempt to observe or study the traits of the ‘material analogue’ of 
the image, to explore its ‘expressiveness,’ conflicts with the intention under-
lying the imaginative act. As Sartre describes this conflict, it seems one 
cannot but move beyond appreciating the color relationships and the forms 
comprising the image thing to an appreciation of the immediate and spon-
taneous presentation of the absent object. By contrast, focusing on the 
perceptual or sensuous traits of the image-thing — for instance, in order to 
isolate just where and how the painting or the photograph incarnates the 
object — only confronts one with the elusive character of the grounding 
expressiveness of the elements of the painting, which Sartre describes as the 
“essential poverty in the material of the image.”3 In a manner similar to the 
relationship between the eyes and the gaze of the other for Sartre, such 
evocative expressiveness allows the object in the painting or photograph to 
be intuited in its absence, without ever being seen as such. 
When Sartre takes pains in Being and Nothingness to distinguish 
between the past as concrete, as lived,4 and the past as explicit object of in-
vestigation,5 he seems to be operating with closely-related phenomenological 
premises. Just as the sensuous richness of the material analogon is screened 
                                                     
1 “The intuitive basis of my image can never be that of a perception.” Sartre, The 
Psychology of Imagination, 58. 
2 Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, 57. 
3 Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, 58. 
4 “(…) the concrete past — this supple, insinuating, changing knowledge which 
makes up the woof of our thoughts, and which is composed of a thousand empty 
indications, a thousand designations which point behind us without words, without 
images, without thesis (….)” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 141. 
5 “To be sure, the Past can be the object of a thesis for me, and indeed it is often 
thematized. But then it is the object of an explicit investigation, and in this case the 
For-itself affirms itself as not being this Past which it posits.” Sartre, Being and 
Nothingness, 140-41. 
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out and thus hidden from what is actually given to the imaginative intention, 
so too does the richness of the past seem screened and hidden from we are 
actually able to remember. At some moments, our grasp of the past may be 
comparatively better than at other moments, but on the whole this grasp 
seems inadequate; the past through which we lived seems a far cry from the 
past we can now apprehend through memory. This is the defining quality of 
the concrete, lived past for Sartre, and it comprises not just the details 
surrounding the scars on one’s body but all the previous relationships to and 
experiences of objects, persons, and situations that may have significance for 
one’s behavior in the present.1  
The concrete, lived past can thus be understood as a form of absence at 
stake in memory in that it resists subjection to voluntary reproduction. In our 
basic, everyday relationship to the past, the concrete, lived past “haunts us at 
a distance without our being able to turn back and face it.”2 In that it lies “out 
of reach” and yet is still “pressing, urgent, imperious,”3 it constitutes the 
meaningful situation to which each intentional act of consciousness occurs as 
a spontaneous response. By contrast, as soon as one would voluntarily in-
spect one’s past, just as one might try to isolate the evocative sensuous 
                                                     
1 “Yet the Past is there constantly. It is the very meaning of the object which I look at 
and which I have already seen, of the familiar faces which surround me. It is the 
origin of this movement which presently follows and which I would not be able to 
call circular if I were not myself — in the Past — the witness of its beginning. It is 
the origin and springboard of all my actions; it is that constantly given density of the 
world which allows me to orient myself and to get my bearings.” Sartre, Being and 
Nothingness, 141. 
This Sartrean notion of a ‘concrete past’ (as opposed to the past as explicit object of 
memory) is congruent with what Merleau-Ponty denotes as the “primitive com-
plicities with the world” that “underlie” knowledge and which bear upon the most 
basic forms of consciousness, such as perception; see Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, 
1981) The Phenomenology of Perception, Colin Smith (Trans) (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul) p. 424. The crucial difference is that Sartre does not afford these 
“complicities” any unilateral primacy in the life of consciousness, and thusly 
eschews a reduction of ‘unreflective’ or involuntary sensuous perception to the mere 
“facticity of the unreflective;” see Len Lawlor (1998) “The end of phenomenology: 
Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty,” Continental Philosophy Review 31: 
15-34, 25. That is to say, Sartre does not subscribe to the notion that the phenomeno-
logical prospects of accounting for involuntary, unreflective awareness are exhausted 
by a focus upon a subjective passivity to and dependence upon the world and the 
structured givenness of its sensuous contents. 
2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 496. 
3 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 496, 499. 
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elements in a painting by Matisse, such a voluntary form of memory takes on 
all the impoverished phenomenal traits that images possess according to 
Sartre — namely, a certain “feebleness, pallor, incompleteness, [and] contra-
dictions with the givens of perception.”1 Similar to how the “impoverish-
ment” of images fails to do justice to the rich relationship of sensuous 
expressiveness or ‘resemblance’ upon which they are founded, the voluntary 
act of recollection falls short of the fecund significance of the past that it 
purports to recapture.2 
Through this account of our access to the past through memory, Sartre 
is committed to showing that the resistance of the concrete past to apprehen-
sion or judgment constitutes a basic form of human finitude,3 namely the 
finitude of memory. Rather than primarily comprising an epistemic condition 
for knowing oneself and for making truthful judgments, the (re-)presence of 
the past in memory is a matter of being related to what fails to be evinced 
properly or adequately.4 On this account, the past to be relived, as the 
                                                     
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 108. 
2 In this respect, Sartre’s analysis of voluntary memorial acts contrasts with the 
Husserlian view that there are no a priori obstacles to an intuitive recovery of one’s 
past. See Edmund Husserl, Collected Works, Volume XI: Phantasy, Image 
Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925), John Brough (trans,), Rudolf Bernet (ed.) 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005) 368-69: “Every act can be reproduced; to every 
‘internal’ consciousness of the act — the internal consciousness taken as perceiving 
— there belongs a possible reproductive consciousness, for example, a possible 
recollection (in which case the question is whether still another reproductive 
consciousness is possible) [....] What we call experience, what we call the act of 
judging, of joy, of the perceiving of something external, even the act of looking at an 
act (which is a positing act of meaning) — all of these are unities of time 
consciousness and are therefore perceived. Now to each such unity a modification 
corresponds: more precisely, a reproducing corresponds to the originary constitution 
of time, to the perceiving, and something re-presented corresponds to what is 
perceived.” 
3 See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 118, for instance, where in this line of thinking 
Sartre closely links the past with the facticity of human life. 
4 “The Past as the unalterable being which I have to be without any possibility of not 
being it does not enter into the unity ‘reflection-reflecting’ of the Erlebnis; it is 
outside. Yet neither does it exist as that of which there is consciousness, in the sense, 
for example, that the perceived chair is that of which there is perceptive 
consciousness [.…] Due to this fact there cannot be a thesis of the past, for one can 
posit only what one is not [.…] Thus the past is not made a thesis, and yet the past is 
not immanent to the For-itself. It haunts the For-itself at the very moment that the 
Bull. anal. phén. X 2 (2014) 
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correlate of the memorial intentional act, is not just marked by what Sartre 
calls its “irremediable” character1 — its unalterable and incontrovertible 
character. It is equally marked by its ambiguous co-existence with the 
present.2 This means Sartre is not just interested in how, through memory, an 
intentional consciousness confronts the past’s sheer indifference to presence 
as yet another avatar of the brute “in-itself.” His interest lies equally in the 
difficulties faced by memorial consciousness in attempting to confront the 
ambiguous, hidden survival of the past. 
This is only part of the picture, however. For certain reasons, a 
Sartrean account of memory cannot be seen to culminate in the claim that 
such finitude of memory is all that can be said about the resistance of the 
past, and about the need for memorial consciousness to overcome it. These 
have to do with the second chief feature of a Sartrean phenomenology of 
memory, namely that his approach disallows any dispassionate form of 
memory. This does not simply mean that memory is always played out 
within a subjective or perspectival dimension, that is, along the vector of an 
individuating and temporally localizing ‘now’ or ‘present.’ Instead, it means 
that for Sartre, memory is to be analyzed not just in terms of the intractability 
and removal of the past, but also in terms of the intentional relation that 
reclaims and allows consciousness to be inhabited by the past in the first 
place. As remains to be seen, with this second feature of memory, the key 
question is whether memory is amenable to being understood as an 
experience of lack.3 This would be the case insofar as acts of memory 
                                                                                                                             
For-itself acknowledges that it is not this or that particular thing.” Sartre, Being and 
Nothingness, 140. 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 496. 
2 See also Jean-Paul Sartre, War Diaries: Notebooks from a Phony War, November 
1939-March 1940, Quentin Hoare (trans.) (London: Verso, 1984) 214: “Thus … the 
for-itself could not irrupt into the world without co-existence in the present with the 
totality of the in-itself and without a precise connection with a having that it 
simultaneously is and is not.” 
3 This follows from Sartre’s efforts to analyze intentional consciousness with 
particular attention to its signal characteristic as a form of lack and desire: “Lack is 
not creative, but the for-itself constitutes itself in face of the in-itself as that which by 
nature lacks in-itself (….) In its negative guise, inasmuch as it is nihilated nothing-
ness, lack is intentionality; consciousness in the Husserlian sense (….) Inasmuch as 
it is nihilation of the in-itself, lack in its positive aspect is desire;” Sartre, War 
Diaries, 233. See also Sartre, War Diaries, 232: “The for-itself’s irruption into the 
world is tantamount to an existential and constitutive auto-determination of the for-
itself, as that which lacks in-itself in the face of in-itself.” 
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demonstrate the ‘lack of grounding’ or ‘being in question’ — the status of 
external unattributability1 — that Sartre accords to all intentional acts of 
consciousness. Memory, on this analysis, would be a crucial instantiation of 
the excessive and unstable consciousness that for Sartre fall under the rubric 
of the “spontaneity” of consciousness as “for-itself.” 
There is more to this second, impassioned feature of memory than a 
simple insistence that consciousness must be the autonomous primum 
movens instituting any relation to the past. In its favor, rather, Sartre disposes 
of a sophisticated phenomenological argument, which can be seen to amount 
to a kind of “nihilogical dualism.”2 Something like a memory from one’s 
childhood can already indicate what this nihilogical dualism consists in. 
Remembering a childhood experience, one can distinguish between no less 
than two ways in which the past is experienced as absent in memory. On the 
one hand, the past appears as absent from the present; one has to look back 
through time in order to recover that moment in one’s life. On the other hand, 
the past appears as absent within the present. The past that appears does not 
belong within the present and clearly seems opposed to it.  
The distinction here is subtle but important. While the former form of 
absence has to do with the withdrawal and hiddenness of the past, as real but 
removed from ‘the now,’ the latter is a question of the distinctive irreality of 
the past’s appearance within the present.3 More specifically, this absence of 
the past ‘within’ the present should be understood as what Husserl, prior to 
Sartre, identified as the conflictual overlapping or phenomenon of Verdeck-
                                                     
1 That is, the intentionality of the conscious act is not attributable to anything outside 
the act itself. 
2 See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 26: “The image must enclose in its very 
structure a nihilating thesis. It constitutes itself qua Image while positing its object as 
existing elsewhere or not existing. It carries within it a double negation; first it is the 
nihilation of the world (since the world is not offering the imagined object as an 
actual object of perception), secondly the nihilation of the object of the image (it is 
posited as not actual), and finally by the same stroke it is the nihilation of itself 
(since it is not a concrete, full psychic process).” 
3 Here, we are using the term in the sense that the act of memory is a type of 
‘presentification’ or Vergegenwärtigung, as Husserl would classify it, which does 
not mean it can conflated with phantasy pure and simple. Despite being characterized 
by a certain kind of irreality or “nullity,” memory is distinguished from phantasy in 
that it is related an actual past, whereas phantasy is directed a sort of non-actual 
being. 
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ung with which the past appears just here, just now within this present of 
consciousness.1  
In Husserl’s carefully elaborated phenomenology of memory and 
phantasy, the phenomenon of Verdeckung is one of the essential ways in 
which an appearing object acquires the status of a “nullity” or an absence.2 
Specifically, the Verdeckung describes how “what gives itself in isolation as 
a phantasy in fact conceals something in reality.”3 If every intentional act has 
its corresponding ‘field of regard,’ that is, horizon of possible intentional 
objects, then we must note that in perception on the one hand and in memory 
and phantasy, on the other, these fields of regard exclude and ‘cover over’ 
each other.4 Accordingly, in phantasy or memory, as soon as one’s attention 
is directed towards an irreal field of appearance, this intuition conflicts with 
and is set off from the perceptual field in which one continues to be bodily 
embedded. One cannot attend to the one without leaving behind the other; the 
appearing of the absent or non-present involves a vanishing or hollowing out 
of the sensuous, perceptually present field of regard within the stream of 
consciousness.5 In terms of memory, this means the ‘intuited absence’ of 
what appears in memory is not tantamount to the temporal absence of a past 
moment of time with respect to the present. 
                                                     
1 On the irreal and conflictual character Husserl attributes to both memory and 
imagination, see Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, 34-35: “A 
thoroughly vital phantasy, the emergence of a very clear memory, as sometimes falls 
to our lot when our faculties are alert and when dispositions are particularly 
favorable, barely gives rise to the consciousness: this is a mere image. [....] Looked 
at more closely, however, this use of the phrase "we actually feel ourselves to be'' is 
surely analogous or indicates a quite momentary deception. What is there is always 
only representation and not being present.” 
2 In this respect, Husserl might be said to go beyond Sartre in advocating a 
“nihilogical pluralism,’ i.e. not just a dualism of the nullity or absence in appear-
ances. 
3 Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, 579. 
4 “It is clear that a phantasy field is not related to the perceptual field as, say, the 
visual field is related to the auditory field, or as one part of the already objectified 
field of regard is related to another part” (Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, 
and Memory, 75). 
5 See Bernet et al, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1993), 149: “A unity of simultaneous intuition in relation 
to perceived and remembered or phantasized objects is thus not possible. In intuition 
I am either turned toward the present or the non-present. However, there exists 
‘among all immanent experiences of one I, a temporal unity’ [....].” 
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There are different places in Sartre’s phenomenology that evince his 
adherence to this kind of nihilogical dualism, and more specifically, his 
endorsement of a view that would distinguish something approaching the 
phenomenon of Verdeckung from other ways in which an appearing object 
can be qualified as absent.1 It is reflected, for instance, in the understanding 
of absence proposed in his account of imagination, where he distinguishes 
between the following: 
(a) the neutral, ‘quasi-absence’ of an image-object (a chair) from an 
image-thing (a painting), which falls under the rubric of “resem-
blance”2 and which is subject to what he calls “quasi-observation.”  
(b) the ‘intuitive absence’ of an image-object from the imagining con-
sciousness, which Sartre describes as the “nothingness” proper to the 
image.3  
Likewise, it surfaces in his description of how the past is related to the 
present4 as both “surpassed” and gratuitously given for itself.5 In memory, as 
                                                     
1 One could also correlate this distinction with the two senses of absence at stake in 
Sartre’s attempt to distinguish between “internal” and “external” negation in Being 
and Nothingness. See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 174-75. 
2 “The material of our image, when we gaze [regardons] at a portrait, is not only a 
jumble of lines and colors [....] It is, in reality, a quasi-person, with a quasi-face, etc.” 
(Sartre, Psychology of Imagination, 22 [translation changed]). This perceptually-
constituted form of absence is that upon which “knowledge” comes to bear in the 
Sartrean account of the structure of the imaginative act. This is, moreover, the sort of 
absence at stake in the sensitivity to perceptual forms, for instance when someone 
has pointed out the shape of a cloud or a stain and one responds “I could see that.” 
On Sartre’s account, such perceptual forms and their sensuous elements are “neutral” 
in terms how they may be apprehended. This is to take nothing away from the 
depictive or pictorial power of such forms, but only to insist that they alone do not 
suffice to conjure up an imagined presence of an object. 
3 Sartre, Psychology of Imagination, 13. 
4 That is, can be “for itself.” 
5 “The For-itself as the foundation of its nothingness — and as such necessary — is 
separated from its original contingency in that it can neither get rid of it nor merge 
with it. It is for itself but in the mode of the irremediable and the gratuitous (....) But 
in so far as it is For-itself, it is never what it is. What it is is behind it as the perpetual 
surpassed. It is precisely this surpassed facticity which we call the Past. The Past 
then is a necessary structure of the For- itself; for the For-itself can exist only as a 
nihilating surpassing, and this surpassing implies something surpassed.” Sartre, 
Being and Nothingness, 137-38. 
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with imagination, the Sartrean perspective would not allow us to establish the 
priority of the one form of absence over the other. Rather, it cautions us 
against the dangers involved in any attempt to reduce them both to a single, 
more basic form of absence. On this view, one can thus question whether a 
univocal conception of absence can suffice to account for the conflict and 
irreality of the past within the present by which memory seems distinguished. 
How then does this nihilogical dualism furnish evidence of the 
impassioned, that is, intentionally invested, character of memory? Indeed, is 
such a distinction between two forms of absence experienced in memory 
even warranted? Here’s the issue; as soon as one concedes the heterogeneity 
and co-originarity1 of the past with the present — as Sartre does — one faces 
a challenge concerning the givenness of the past in the present. In memory, 
the present opens onto the past that is heterogeneous to it; the past is ‘not’ the 
present and is thus an absence or nullity with respect to the present. In what 
does this nullity or absence of the past, antithetical to the being of the present 
in which it appears, consist? As has been pointed out via Husserl, the 
givenness of the past in the present is distinguished by the way, in memory, a 
“clash” occurs in consciousness, and this so in two senses.2 In opening onto 
the past, the act of memory marks a break with the preceding course of one’s 
experience, as well as with the attention given to one’s own perceptual 
environs. Apart from its temporal determination as ‘not now,’ therefore, the 
past given in the present of consciousness is thus absent in a particular sense 
— its absence is in part determined by a “separation of the perceptual and 
phantasy fields” in the course of present experience of consciousness.3 
                                                     
1 Like Deleuze, Sartre too insists on the co-originarity of the past alongside the 
present, and so goes beyond the mere thesis of the co-existence of past and present. 
See the comments on the phenomenon of birth in Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 
138-39. 
2 “Attention to the one clashes with a simultaneous attention to the other.” Bernet et 
al, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1993), 149. 
3 “[...] no difference exists between a physical image appearance and a perceptual 
appearance, and yet, through conflict with the given field of regard, a difference in 
characterization emerges: the image object turns into a figment. Is such a difference 
to be found, then? According to our position, by virtue of the separation of the 
perceptual and phantasy fields, the difference cannot be the same as it is in the case 
of the common image object. However, is there not a distinction of a different sort 
that nevertheless functions in a similar way? I certainly think so” (Husserl, Phantasy, 
Image Consciousness, and Memory, 74). 
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If these descriptions are accurate, then the phenomenon of Verdeckung 
at stake in memory attests to a way that consciousness impassions itself or is 
caught up in intentionally recapturing the past, namely by clearing away the 
perceptual world and our sense of embodiment within it in order to welcome 
the appearance of the past. In other words, to attribute all the impetus behind 
memory to the sheer remoteness and inaccessibility of the past thus seems to 
run the risk of a deep phenomenological incoherence, at least regarding the 
question of the present’s investment in or involvement with the past.1 The 
way present consciousness opens onto and directs itself toward the past — 
what we have called the impassioned character of memory — cannot merely 
stem from the past’s irreducibility to and concealment from the present. This 
would be to confuse the conditionality of memory — the interlocking of the 
past with the present — with what we might think of as the ‘effective causal-
ity’ evinced in the nullity of the Verdeckung phenomenon, which seems 
equally at stake in any appearing of the past. Something more is needed, in 
the sense that in the act of memory consciousness reclaims the past and 
allows itself to be inhabited by that appearance of the past.  
Admittedly, the strength of this argument from nihilogical dualism 
rests in the robustness of the descriptions of this nullity, clash, and separation 
of the Verdeckung that we have claimed demonstrates the impassioned and 
intentional character of all, and not just some, forms of memory. For his part, 
Husserl appears to link this clash or conflict to a kind of freedom, namely a 
freedom to ‘live’ in a phantasy world that “devours” the perceptual world 
and its stable, intentionally-motivating interconnections.2 On his side, Sartre 
                                                     
1 This distinction seems linked to Deleuze’s worry whether a co-original, con-
temporaneous, and co-existent past that grounds its givenness can also drive its 
givenness in the present, or whether something more is indeed involved in memory. 
See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Paul Patton (trans.) (London: 
Continuum, 1994) 110-11: “The Ideas nonetheless remain the ground on which the 
successive presents are organized in the circle of time, so that the pure past which 
defines them is itself still necessarily expressed in terms of a present, as an ancient 
mythical present [....] The shortcoming of the ground is to remain relative to what it 
grounds, to borrow the characteristics of what it grounds, and to be proved by these 
(….) Just as the ground is in a sense ‘bent’ and must lead us to a beyond, so the 
second synthesis of time points beyond itself in the direction of a third [....]” 
2 “I can also depict the house in phantasy, and now I actually do it. However, I can 
depict the phantasy only up to the point at which this house comes in. While I am 
now actually perceiving the house, I cannot have a complete phantasy in which this 
perception of the house, exactly as I am having it, functions as a component. A 
tension exists there, a mutual exclusion. For example, I must turn my glance away: 
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sees a remedy to this worry in observing a form of Unselbstständigkeit — 
insufficiency, inadequacy — not rooted in the inaccessibility and resistance 
of the past, but rather stemming from within consciousness itself.1 To 
understand why Sartre might claim that in memory there is a sense of lack 
related to the past, but which does not stem from the past, one needs to see 
how Sartre instates a principle of privation at all levels of experience, which 
thereby comprises the phenomena of memory.  
The plausibility of such a description turns on the reversal effected by 
Sartre; typically, experiences are associated with forms of evidence, albeit 
usually empirical ones. With Sartre’s claim, on the other hand, that “each 
particular for-itself (Erlebnis) lacks a particular and concrete reality,”2 a 
rather different picture of experience emerges. 
Sartre’s phenomenological argument for why experiences are forms of 
lack or ‘being in question’ at their core can be summed up as follows: 
(a) Insofar as each experience involves intentionality, which is to say a 
directness or relatedness toward something, each experience fails to be 
fully situated or grounded in that of which it is the experience.3 
                                                                                                                             
Naturally, while I am perceiving, I can daydream, dream with my eyes open. The 
phantasy images belong to another world, and in a way the perceptual world is 
swallowed up. Now the perceptual world does not actually disappear, but I ‘live’ in 
the phantasy world, not in the perceptual world [….] One devours the other, so to 
speak: but they do this successively and, in a certain sense, to be sure, together as 
well” (Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, 540). 
1 “For my part, I put a new type of Unselbstständigkeit on the side of consciousness” 
(Sartre, War Diaries, 240). In other words, each act of consciousness lacks self-
sufficiency and is at the same time experienced as such, because of the fact that each 
consciousness involves non-thetic self-awareness: “It is just so difficult to live with-
out being in any way justified” (Sartre, War Diaries, 65). It is thus this observation 
of an “Unselbstständigkeit on the side of consciousness” which leads Sartre to see in 
each intentional relation to an object both an self-apprehension regarding the 
unjustifiability of consciousness and a minimal form of desire to remove from 
consciousness that very lack of intentional justification: “A for-itself, whatever it 
may be, grasps an aspect of the world only as an opportunity to annihilate in the in-
itself the lack that it itself is” (Sartre, War Diaries, 214-15). 
2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 95. 
3 For example, the origin of the feeling of heat is not exhausted in the physical 
emanation of heat from the stove to my finger, thirst does not culminate in dryness of 
the mouth, and so on. “Concretely, each for-itself is a lack of a certain coincidence 
with itself. That means it is haunted by the presence of that with which it should 
coincide in order to be itself” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 100).  
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(b) All experience involves an awareness of itself,1 namely as unjustifiable 
lack of ground.2 
(c) Insofar as each experience fails to be sufficiently grounded in that of 
which it is the experience and is aware of itself as lack of ground, each 
experience is simultaneously the pursuit of such a basis for itself, i.e. as 
the givenness or appearing of something.3 
In other words, what experience “(…) lacks, in all events, is what it makes 
itself to be at each precise instant.”4 
Lest this sketch of Sartre’s position foster a misunderstanding, it 
should be noted that when we say that for Sartre every form of intentional 
consciousness involves a feeling of lack, such an awareness of lack (con-
comitant with the experience of the intentional object) in no way distracts or 
detracts from the reality of what is experienced. For example, in Sartre’s 
description of what it is like to suffer, when he writes that “[o]ne suffers and 
one suffers from not suffering enough,”5 there is no insinuation that the 
feeling of suffering has somehow been buffered or lessened by an awareness 
of lack. Sartre’s claim that “[t]he suffering which I experience (...) is never 
adequate suffering”6 is thus directed neither at the veridical status of the 
suffering — i.e. whether there is the suffering — nor at its veridical degree 
— i.e. how real or imagined it is. Rather, the question of lack and adequacy 
arises at the level of the givenness of the suffering, of the conditions under 
which it appears.7 In other words, the fact that the suffering seems 
inadequate at the moment of its experience is for Sartre a matter of its 
veridical quality. It is the quality with which the suffering is felt, as real, as 
intense to this or that degree, that calls into question or creates a sense of lack 
                                                     
1 “The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from itself, 
as presence to itself” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 78). 
2 “To be for itself is to lack (….) and to lack is defined as to be determined as not 
being that of which the existence would be necessary and sufficient to give one a 
plenary existence” (Sartre, War Diaries, 232). 
3 “(…) the for-itself is effectively a perpetual project of founding itself qua being and 
a perpetual failure of this project” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 620). 
4 Rudolf Bernet, “Sartre’s ‘Consciousness’ as Drive and Desire,” in Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, 33: 1(January 2002) 5. 
5 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 91. 
6 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 92. 
7 “Concretely, each particular for-itself [Erlebnis] lacks a certain reality, which if the 
for-itself were synthetically assimilated with it, would transform the for-itself into 
itself” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 95). 
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regarding the disclosive adequacy or phenomenal justification of the 
intentional experience in which such suffering is given. 
                                                     
This connection between lack and intentional experience is made 
especially clear in Sartre’s ascription of a normativity of self-justification to 
experiences and feelings:  
A feeling, for example, is a feeling in the presence of a norm; that is, a feeling 
of the same type, but one which would be what it is. This norm or totality of 
the affective self is directly present as a lack suffered in the very heart of 
suffering.1 
Sartre’s argument here seems to be that since the suffering cannot be isolated 
in any one of the aspects towards which experience is directed when it is felt 
— the grimace of the face, the convulsion of the body, the interruption of 
clear thought — an uncertainty or uneasiness as to the appropriateness of the 
givenness of suffering is immediately made apparent in the experience. 
When Sartre thus speaks of how there may be a certain lack of surprise in the 
suffering,2 it is not that one can willfully distance oneself from it, in order to 
contemplate its onset or its regression. It is rather a case of perceptual faith 
undermined; the awareness of suffering harbors suspicions or qualms about 
the justifiability of its givenness. The apparent passivity of suffering is im-
mediately belied by the potential superfluity of our awareness of it, and 
indeed by the seeming inadequacy of our response to it.3  
When transposed back into the context of memory, then, this intrinsic 
connection between lack and intentional consciousness has to be seen to 
underlie Sartre’s attribution of a form of desire to memorial experience. This 
is, namely, a desire in response to the inherent lack or inadequacy of 
experience, that is, a desire to be an appropriate givenness of the irremedi-
able, resistant past. As Sartre writes:  
(...) memory presents to us the being which we were, accompanied by a 
plenitude of being which confers on it a sort of poetry. That grief we had — 
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 91. 
2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 92. 
3 “At the point of being made one with itself, it escapes, separated from itself by 
nothing, by that nothingness of which it is itself the foundation. It is loquacious 
because it is not adequate, but its ideal is silence — the silence of the statue, of the 
beaten man who lowers his head and veils his face without speaking” (Sartre, Being 
and Nothingness, 92). 
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although fixed in the past — does not cease to present the meaning of a for-
itself, yet exists with the silent fixity of the grief of another.1 
The implication here seems to be the following; while that particular detail or 
aspect of the past seems to have much to say to us — this is its plenitude, its 
“poetry,” its meaning — the appropriateness or adequacy of its experience — 
this is the “silent fixity” of the past’s givenness in memory — remains 
disproportional, inadequate. That is, in memory there seems to be the in-
herent risk that its intentional givenness may do injustice to the past in a 
similar way to how we run the risk of an inappropriate or inadequate 
response to the grief and suffering of another. 
Once properly elaborated, then, a Sartrean analysis of memory would 
seem to enable us to appreciate more fully the way absence is at work in 
memory, in two distinct forms:  
(a) in terms of the finitude of memory, which is to say, the indifferent, 
irremediable past as gone or removed from the present; 
(b) in terms of the lack intrinsic to the intentional character of memory, 
which is to say, the uneasiness in and of intentional experience that 
institutes a desire to reclaim not just the past but equally the very 
grounds for its givenness in and through the present.2  
Moreover, if we consider the bigger picture for a moment, the take-home 
point regarding this Sartrean account of memory is that it dovetails very 
nicely with Sartre’s efforts to understand what can be called the heteronomy 
of desire. The Sartrean concern with desire centers on the fact that desire is 
not simply “auto-determinative”3 or autarchic, but that it has two governing 
principles. On the one hand, desire signifies coming under the sway of a 
                                                     
1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 119. 
2 Our claim regarding two sorts of absence in memory also seems in line with 
Sartre’s criticisms of Heidegger in the War Diaries for reducing lack to finitude. See 
Sartre, War Diaries, 239: “One must never try to explain nothingness by finitude, 
since finitude taken in itself alone seems a characteristic external to the individual 
under consideration.” See also Sartre’s criticisms of Heideggerian angst in Sartre, 
War Diaries, 131: “But it is true that for Heidegger anguish is anguish-at-
nothingness, which is not Nothing but as Wahl says ‘a cosmic fact against which 
existence stands out.’” See as well Sartre, War Diaries, 239: “Anguish at the 
nothingness of the world, anguish at the origins of the existent — these are derived 
and secondary …” 
3 Sartre, War Diaries, 232.  
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particular object; the object seems appealing for certain reasons, and as we 
know these reasons can be quite ambiguous and complicated. On the other 
hand, the heteronomy of desire has to do with how the experience of desire 
seems to leave no room for what is lacked or missed by it to be productive of 
the desire.1 As Sartre himself puts it: 
For there to be desire, it is necessary that the desired object should be con-
cretely present — it and no other — in the innermost depths of the for-itself, 
but present as a nothingness, or more accurately, as a lack. And this is only 
possible if the for-itself is susceptible to being defined by these lacks. Which 
means no lack can come from the outside to the for-itself.2  
That is, despite the apparent ‘force’ of that to which form of desire may be 
related, such as the past to be explored and recovered, the desire seems to 
recognize no source other than itself.  
One way to relate to this claim is think of what it is like with children 
at the dinner table; no matter how appealing the food, no matter the preced-
ent, as soon as there is a hint of coercion, their appetite begins to wane. To 
threaten their sense of choice is to infect the very food before them, and a 
similar sort of point could be made here with respect to love relations. 
Examples such as these then seem to undermine the basis for insisting 
sheerly upon either force, finitude, or passivity in order to account for the 
phenomenological characteristics of desire.3 Rather, this heteronymous 
quality of desire seems to bear all the traits of the intentionality without self-
justification about which the early Sartre writes the following: “In its 
                                                     
1 The lack constituting desire for Sartre “does not belong to the nature of the in-
itself” and “appears in the world only with the upsurge of human reality. It is only in 
the human world that there can be lacks.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 86. 
2 Sartre, War Diaries, 231. 
3 See Sartre, War Diaries, 231, on the “absurdity of a Nietzschean ‘will-to-power’” 
as explication of lack or desire; in the end these are only forces or more precisely 
‘states of force’ which may meet with “antagonistic” states of force. As Deleuze 
similarly appears to show with respect to the “eruption of needs” and the source of 
desire in the unconscious, these forces are phenomenologically ambivalent. They 
may signify as much a surfeit as a deficiency on the part of the existent (like the 
fatigue), neither of which allows one to understand what might be missing or what 
might need to be appropriated or reclaimed by such ‘force-of-will.’ Deleuze draws 
the conclusion that desire is then not about appropriation, nothingness, or lack, 
whereas Sartre attempts to look for its source in yet another type of finitude (i.e. one 
inherent to consciousness alone, and not derived from the co-limitation of forces, 
essences, etc.); see Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 98, 131. 
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negative guise, inasmuch as it is nihilated nothingness, lack is intentionality; 
consciousness in the Husserlian sense.”1 
There is reason, however, to go a step further than this correlation of 
lack, intentionality and desire in Sartre. The further contention here is that a 
Sartrean account of memorial intentionality can prove adept at handling one 
particularly vexing case of memory, namely those fascinating instances of 
so-called involuntary memory. 
 
In an exploration of Proust and subjectivity, Roland Breeur draws 
attention to the foreignness or strangeness of involuntary memories; “the 
involuntary memory comes to me from the outside (involuntary means: ‘I 
have not chosen it’) while being from the inside (of memory).”2 All the 
same, when Breeur remarks a few pages later that “I do not know what 
attracts me to it nor why it affects me,”3 we are reminded that the apparently 
foreign character of involuntary memories is tempered by a sense of 
connection to what they present, under the form of an attraction to or 
investment in something inviolable and unchanging about oneself. As Breeur 
puts it,  
tial’ about myself [‘l’essentiel’ de moi-
même] was not born away with it.4  
relation to intentional consciousness, in light of their mixed phenomenal 
                                                     
What is striking about the involuntary memory is not only the recalling of the 
past in spite of one’s forgetting, but also the fact that despite the irreversible 
character of the past, ‘what is essen
Involuntary memories are, in other words, captivating due to the special 
access they grant, not to a hidden dimension of experience, but to a sort of 
self-awareness unaffected by the passing of time and unassimilable with the 
sense of self typically derived from voluntary memories. If and when they 
appear, they are thus difficult, if not impossible, to ignore. In the following, I 
would like to build upon these and other aspects of Breeur’s discussion of 
involuntary memories — which, to be clear, is explicitly concerned in that 
work with Proust and not Sartre — in an attempt to address the following 
question: just how is one to understand the provenance of such memories in 
1 Sartre, War Diaries, 233. 
2 Roland Breeur, Singularité et sujet: Une lecture phénoménologique de Proust 
(Grenoble: Editions Jerome Millon) 153. [The translations presented here are my 
own.] 
3 Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 159. 
4 Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 167. 
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traits1 as both intrinsically foreign to any type of behavioral control and yet 
essentially vested by a form of interest, attachment, or desire? 
There seems to be at least one thing that is easy to agree upon — such 
memories can be readily defined as ‘involuntary’ because their institution 
does not seem to be the product of a force of will. Such a definition, 
however, does not seem sufficient to claim that they involve no intentionality 
whatsoever. We may note furthermore, without yet invoking notions of either 
passivity or activity, that if it is true that such memories seem unusual, this is 
in part because in them there is a conscious relation to the past with great 
detail and intensity. Such memories thus distinguish themselves by their stark 
contrast with the stale or bland character of voluntary memory. The question 
is this: do they also distinguish themselves by an utter passivity and a dearth 
of intentionality in regard to their experience? If we take into consideration 
Sartre’s distinction between will and intention,2 can we say that the way 
involuntary memories are clearly devoid of will entails that they are also 
devoid of intention? 
Instead of stressing their supposed passivity or foreclosure of any 
‘active synthesis,’ it seems possible to make a rather different case for under-
standing the most pronounced phenomenal characteristics of involuntary 
memories. The following questions in particular merit examination:  
(a) involuntary memories as forms of consciousness;  
(b) the astonishment involved in involuntary memories; 
(c) the fascinating vividness of involuntary memories. 
What I hope to show is that upon closer examination, each of these traits may 
speak for rather than against a significant role of intentional consciousness, 
as understood by Sartre, in involuntary memories.  
For starters, we should spell out the sense in which involuntary 
memories may be thought of as strange or foreign occurrences in the flow of 
consciousness. Concerning this foreignness, Breeur specifies that “the in-
voluntary memory evokes a separation (écart) that is already latent, a 
separation that is nestled within the separation articulated by memory,”3 and 
goes on to clarify that while every sort of past experience may be invoked in 
                                                     
1 Breeur refers to these contradictions in the involuntary memory in terms of the way 
their “independence is not absolute;” they are unable on their own to support the 
meaning of the past they evoke (Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 157).  
2 Sartre, Psychology of Imagination,18, 22. 
3 Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 160 
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them,1 the involuntary memory does not seem to be subject to itself.2 This 
would suggest that the involuntary memory is not easily assimilable with the 
temporality of consciousness, which might lead one to postulate that such 
memories are then unconscious and thus non-intentional in character.  
Against this view, however, it must be argued that involuntary 
memories are about a confrontation with something from the past that is both 
“unsurpassable” and “inalienable,” as Breeur also writes.3 To that extent, it 
must be insisted that involuntary memories do involve a form of conscious-
ness or awareness; it would be a hard sell to try to argue that such a 
confrontation with the past could remain unconscious or unknown. However 
uncommon they may seem, such involuntary memories are nonetheless to be 
approached in terms of what they share and indeed define in terms a holistic 
view of conscious experience. If this point can be conceded, then an 
understanding of their relationship to the intentionality of consciousness 
seems ineluctable; we cannot simply operate under the assumption that they 
represent the mere negation of all intentionality. Rather than being seen as a 
case to be excluded from intentional consciousness, they may rather be seen 
as the exception that defines the norm, guiding our understanding of 
intentional consciousness.  
One might still be skeptical on this question. For instance, in focusing 
upon the specifically conscious character of involuntary memories, one 
problem spot could be the astonishment or surprise we may feel in experienc-
ing them. This astonishment seems to be another important reason behind 
their classification as ‘involuntary’ rather than ‘voluntary’ memories, insofar 
as such involuntary memories evince the finitude of our memories, which is 
to say, the fact that we are not accustomed to having such memories in such 
detail, and can find little reason for the fact that we are having them now, in 
this way, at this time. For instance, when walking past a house I once lived 
in, I may have a profound memory of something someone said to me in 
passing or something of which I had taken little note. Yet I have walked past 
this old house of mine a number of times — why is it that at just this time, I 
can surprisingly remember my friend speaking to me so clearly? The 
temptation once again surfaces to see such astonishment as a sign of a 
                                                     
1 And thus not just “exceptional events” or moments of “suffering, regret,” etc. 
(Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 160). 
2 “(...) the very experience of the involuntary memory (and thus of an excess of 
meaning) is not in itself the subject of a subsequent involuntary memory” (Breeur, 
Singularité et sujet, 160). 
3 Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 156. 
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fundamental form of passivity — i.e. dearth of intentionality — underpinning 
the involuntary memory. 
All the same, the unanticipated character of the involuntary memory 
— the fact that nothing seems to have anticipated or motivated it in the prior 
course of one’s experience — appears at least to allow for more than one 
understanding of it. Unanticipated things happen to us all the time — and in 
that respect it may be said that such events reflect a certain passivity and 
finitude on our parts. However, there still seems to be a viable phenomeno-
logical distinction between such unanticipated events, as subject to an 
‘external’ perceptual consciousness, and the sort of unanticipated mental 
events that involuntary memories are. This is because, in contrast to in-
voluntary memories, unanticipated events in external perception are typically 
never recognized as such. Such sorts of unanticipated events are rather 
distinguished by their post-factual character; it is only after the fact of their 
occurrence, for instance, on the basis of perceptual observance of their 
repercussions, that we may exhibit surprise, incredulity, or disbelief of their 
happening. A rather different sort of awareness seems involved in in-
voluntary memories, insofar as in them the givenness of the past seems both 
groundless and unmotivated and is immediately recognized as such. That is, 
in a similar fashion to extremely realistic dreams, what seems most astonish-
ing about involuntary memories is the utterly convincing presence of what is 
given here and now in the involuntary memory, rather any question of how 
the distance to the past experience has been commuted. In this way, the 
astonishment involved in involuntary memories seems more susceptible to 
description as an unjustifiable intentional consciousness of the past — a 
consciousness which precisely nothing seems to motivate or impel, a con-
sciousness whose occurrence is able to do justice to the vibrancy of the past 
experience precisely because it has no reason to be a givenness of the past, to 
be an overcoming of the typical resistance, removal, and absence of the past.  
However, insisting upon the vibrancy or vivid nature of involuntary 
memories still raises quite a tangle of issues. Isn’t that vividness of the in-
voluntary memory evidence of how, in them, something is given about which 
there can be no question of choice or control, whose givenness in other 
words has in no way been selected by an intention? This aspect of 
involuntary memories could motivate their denotation as forms of passivity 
and hence as cancelations of intentional life. In the way the past seems to 
intervene or force itself upon us, involuntary memories would seem to 
confront us with a hidden past which had never been as present or as 
vivacious as it now appears in the involuntary memory. Would such vivid-
ness of the past not then indicate a chiasm of the richness of the past and the 
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present — an ‘institution’ of memory as Merleau-Ponty might refer to it1 — 
in which consciousness is swept up in the involuntary memory? 
Closer consideration, however, raises certain hesitations about such 
conclusions. The vivid nature of involuntary memories has to do with the 
sharpness and the sensuousness of what is given — in the memory, for 
instance, I hear my friend speaking to me with great clarity, and with a clear 
sense of the precise circumstances in which this occurred. Does this vivid 
nature of the involuntary memory simply reflect passivity on the part of the 
remembering subject, or might it not evince a form of intentional relation to 
the past? After all, with the sensuousness and sharpness of the involuntary 
memory the point is that certain things stand out; in a novel manner, we are 
immediately concerned with and fully focused upon certain aspects of an 
object or state-of-affairs rather than others. The presence of a certain object, 
in a certain way, is above all else what matters most in the involuntary 
memory. In such a guise, as Breeur suggests, “that which evokes the memory 
hides nothing,”2 or in other words, does not draw our attention to any 
concealed dimension of the past.  
In this sense, it would hasty to suppose that the involuntary memory is 
about exposure to the force of the past or a confrontation with an a-subjective 
cycle by which the past comes to presence. To think as much would be 
attribute the vividness of the involuntary memory to a hidden power and 
economy of the past, underwriting both its givenness in memory and our 
fascination with it. It would be to suppose, in other words, that an exposure 
to the force of the past, in either its magnitude stretching out behind the 
present or in its cumulative weight bearing down upon the present, lends 
intensity to involuntary memories, because what is vivid in them is the way 
the past moment of experience suddenly becomes revealed or unconcealed. 
However, a distinction needs to be drawn here; irrespective of whether one 
sees involuntary memories as involving an experience of the hidden, their 
vividness must be understood to derive from an entirely different feature of 
involuntary memories. Their vividness has to do with the way something so 
real, so clear is re-lived through memory, that is, through a recollecting or 
reminiscing consciousness, with such sharpness and focus. As Breeur points 
out in regard to Proust,3 such vividness rather seems to indicate the clarity of 
                                                     
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) 224-25. 
2 Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 156.  
3 “The insignificant detail evokes, in addition to the past, the fact that in me 
something has not acquiesced and that I continue to love the being that my memory 
had already abandoned” (Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 157). See also: “Contrary to a 
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a detail from one’s past, yet whose pastness is the least important or least 
significant attribute. The vivid trait of involuntary memories would thus 
seem to speak to a relatedness or a ‘directedness’ rather than a passivity on 
the part of the memorial consciousness, which would present an argument for 
seeing a form of intentionality at work in the involuntary memory. 
This same point may be reinforced if one focuses upon another facet of 
the vividness of involuntary memories, namely, that a form of fascination 
seems bound up with them. The question is; how should such fascination be 
understood? On the one hand, taking up my example once more, what seems 
fascinating about such memories is the way that they present to me what had 
been gone, up until the memory. The involuntary memory would be 
fascinating, in other words, because of the manner in which it grants access 
to a past both determinative of my present yet far removed from it, as if 
furnishing a confrontation with a missing piece of the puzzle of ourselves. I 
was that person who heard my friend speaking, in that situation, in that place, 
and yet I no longer knew this, prior to the involuntary memory. In the 
involuntary memory, things that had been hidden, for instance things about 
myself, become revealed in unprecedented fashion. 
Again, this account of the fascination at stake in involuntary memories 
may be only part of the story. The question raised earlier seems pertinent 
here; how is it that the lost, hidden, and past moment of experience can so 
affect me in the present, as to instill this deep sense of fascination? If one 
claims that the loss of the past is what is so fascinating in the present, 
involuntary memory, is this not to suppose that such fascination solely 
derives from the object of fascination, which is to say, the lost, irremediable, 
and resistant past? Such a description, however, seems to clash with the way 
the involuntary memory is in fact engrossing; as Breeur puts it, “its presence 
is more of a surprise than a reprise.”1 That is, to say that the fascination with 
what had been absent prior to the involuntary memory is more about an 
appearance despite the past rather than one intrinsically bound to it. Breeur’s 
description is poignant on this point:  
My so-called involuntary memories instate a distance with the past in which a 
distance in myself is expressed. The distance is not solely the evocation of the 
time that separates me from a former version of myself (time as articulation of 
                                                                                                                             
‘totalizing’ conception of memory, the detail or the impression brings to light 
something that does not allow itself to be incorporated by the meaning possessed by 
the totality of the past, and in which memory comes to be ensconced” (Breeur, 
Singularité et sujet, 157). 
1 Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 168. 
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a separation), but the evocation of something in me that time cannot affect 
(separation within the temporalizing separation).1  
Considered in terms of a Sartrean account of memory, and more generally, of 
the heteronomy of phenomena of desire, a different understanding of such 
fascination seems to open up here. This would be to see the fascination at 
work in involuntary memory as not solely being about a lack or loss of the 
past, but equally, as being about a lack in and of the present, namely to 
vindicate the excessive, detailed, intense givenness of the past in the present, 
as the present of the involuntary memory. In other words, the fascination in 
the involuntary memory can be seen as a fascination with what impels the 
startling givenness of this richly detailed past, which is to say, as a 
fascination with the excessive, disproportional present givenness of a long-
hidden past. We are fascinated not only with our separation from the resistant 
past — how, as it were, the distance is commuted — but also with the 
disproportional basis for such givenness of the past in the present.  
 
In conclusion, then, Sartre’s emphasis on the resistance of the past, on 
the excessive and disproportional character of intentional relatedness, and on 
the heteronomy of desire underlying such intention relations all seem to point 
to useful and precise distinctions and questions for further thought, when it 
comes to understanding those sorts of memory — involuntary — which some 
might be disposed to use against him. More specifically, on the merits of a 
Sartrean analysis of memory, Sartre thus appears able to level a criticism at 
both Heidegger’s translation of intentionality as openness or transcendence2 
and Merleau-Ponty’s reduction of all givenness to “a dehiscence of Being,” 
to “the concretion of a universal visibility, of one sole space that separates 
and unites, that sustains every cohesion.”3 The question is whether such 
                                                     
1 See Breeur, Singularité et sujet, 161. 
2 This may be observed in Heidegger’s philosophy in the following: “We have a 
twofold task: (1) to conceive intentionality itself more radically, and then (2) to 
elucidate its consequences for what we have called the ‘transposition’ of the Dasein 
over things [.…] It will turn out that intentionality is founded in Dasein’s trans-
cendence and is possible solely for this reason—that transcendence cannot converse-
ly be explained in terms of intentionality.” Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, Albert Hofstadtler (trans.) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1982) 162. 
3 “The ‘visual quale’ gives me, and is alone in doing so, the presence of what is not 
me, of what is simply and fully. It does so because, as a texture, it is the concretion 
of a universal visibility, of one sole space that separates and unites, that sustains 
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openness to absence and presence, founded upon an over-arching trans-
cendence or écart of being, fully captures all the experiential features of an 
intentionality for which something is not merely absent, but that is lacking or 
missing. 
The aim in the preceding, however, was not simply to argue for the 
internal coherence of Sartre’s account of memory and intentionality, and for 
how well they fit within the greater framework of a phenomenology of 
desire, for instance by highlighting what might be called Sartre’s ‘nihilogical 
dualism’ of intentionality and desire. Instead, the claim has been that a 
Sartrean account of both intentional consciousness and memory proves adept 
at mapping the various phenomenological traits of involuntary memories, 
above all because of the crucial way that Sartre makes room for a nuanced 
understanding of the intuition of absence(s) in such experiences. Moreover, 
on the strength of this analysis of involuntary memories, the lesson to be 
drawn concerning the resistance of the past is that it ought not be conceived 
as a way of the past enforcing, from a distance, a form of finitude on con-
sciousness or the subject. That is, the resistance of the past is not an external 
condition imposed upon memorial experience; it is not an obstacle or force 
against which memorial recall, and the vibrancy and detail thereof, may be 
measured as frail, indistinct, etc. Rather, resistance of the past, as Sartre 
would understand it, stems from an internal condition upon memorial 
experience, imposed in and by intentional consciousness itself. This con-
dition is namely the conflict within all such intentional consciousness to 
confront the absence within itself — its own absence of ground — from 
which stem its spontaneous, at times even gratuitous seeming relationships 
not only with the world and its situations, but equally to its own experience 
and the qualities and truths of the world encountered therein. 
The inference here may be that such a Sartrean account paints human 
experience rather darkly or bleakly, for instance by depicting the human 
motives in dealing with, recalling, and recovering the past as solely being 
about a desire for appropriation of ground. In other words, any question of 
justice in dealing with the past, via one or other form of memory, would 
                                                                                                                             
every cohesion (and even that of past and future, since there would be no such 
cohesion if they were not essentially parts of the same space). Every visual some-
thing, as individual as it is, functions also as a dimension, because it is given as the 
result of a dehiscence of being. What this ultimately means is that what defines the 
visible is to have a lining of invisibility in the strict sense, which is makes present as 
a certain absence.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” Carleton Dallery 
(trans.) in Ted Toadvine and Len Lawlor (eds.) The Merleau-Ponty Reader (Evans-
ton: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 2007) 375. 
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seem to be debarred from the outset by Sartre’s account, insofar as it is all 
simply a matter of how the individual looks to what appears of the past for 
apt or suitable solutions to its own (selfish) existential or metaphysical un-
ease. One could counter this view, however, by arguing that one of Sartre’s 
goals from the outset is to render possible a conception of justice or fairness, 
insofar as he attempts to avoid all the “tricks of stoicism”1 — for example by 
not pandering to any values or norms of self-assurance from which justice is 
to be dispensed — in light of the phenomenological evidence of the adversity 
and complexity of human life, imposed not just from the outside, by the 
world, but from within consciousness itself. 
                                                     
1 Sartre, War Diaries, 65. 
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